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A SIZEABLE SLING STONE: THE STAGGERING IMPACT OF
UNITED STATES V COLORADO ON THE EPA
GOLIATH
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no clear solution in any of the applicable legislative
sources, yet state and federal governments struggle fervently for
control of cleanups at federal hazardous waste sites. Environmental
statutes such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA")' and the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") 2 embody discrete standards
for regulation and enforcement, but the scope of these as well as
state and local rules is ambiguous. Cumbersome language and un-
certain congressional intentions make application of the law diffi-
cult for courts.3 Even more exacting is the task of reconciling
EPA's goals of uniformity in regulation with state and local agency
goals of thoroughness in cleanup.
United States v. Cotorado dramatizes the conflict between fed-
eral and state authorities in environmental waste regulation. Colo-
rado authorities asserted regulatory control, as delegated under
RCRA provisions, over cleanup at the Basin F hazardous waste site.5
In response, the United States Army, presiding over the cleanup,
invoked CERCLA provisions to contest state jurisdiction over the
matter.6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980 ("CERCLA"), §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA") §§ 3001-5006,
42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-56 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Congress enacted RCRA to amend
the Solid Waste Disposal Act ("SWDA") 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1988 & Supp. IV
1992).
3. See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1080 (Ist Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902
(D.N.H. 1985)) ("CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely
drafted provisions and indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history."); United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986) ("[The
owner and operator liability section] like so much of this hastily patched together
compromise act [CERCLA], is not a model of statutory clarity."); United States v.
Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.NJ. 1983) ("[CERCLA] was hastily, and, there-
fore, inadequately drafted. Even the legislative history must be read with caution
since last minute changes in the bill were inserted with little or no explanation.").
4. 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
5. Id. at 1571-72.
6. Id. at 1572.
(163)
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found, however, that RCRA-driven state actions may carve out a sig-
nificant role in CERCLA-backed federal cleanups. 7
This Note will examine areas where RCRA and CERCLA coin-
cide and diverge, and what United States v. Colorado means for future
interpretation of state involvement in federal waste disposal. Part I
of this Note will give an overview of the cases in which courts have
tried to reconcile them. Part II will review the Colorado court's statu-
tory analysis and will consider the court's policy goals of increasing
state regulation of federal cleanups. Finally, Part III will speculate
about the repercussions of a broader state role in CERCLA actions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. RCRA
Congress devised RCRA in order to manage all solid wastes.8
The legislative intent behind RCRA was twofold. First, Congress in-
tended to assist local and state governments in finding a solution to
the discarded materials problem. 9 Second, Congress intended to
prevent improper waste disposal on a national scale.' 0 Overall,
Congress envisioned a system in which state authorities would carry
out minimum performance standards promulgated by EPA."
7. Id. at 1578.
8. Nancy E. Milstein, Note, How Well Can States Enforce Their Environmental
Laws When the Polluter is the United States Government?, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 123, 125
(1986).
9. See SWDA § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a). This provision proposes the ob-
jective of "providing technical and financial assistance to State and local govern-
ments and interstate agencies for the development of solid waste management
plans...." Id. See also RCRA § 3006, 42 U.S.C. § 6926. ("[EPA], after consultation
with State authorities, shall promulgate guidelines to assist states in the develop-
ment of State hazardous waste programs.") SWDA § 1003(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a).
Moreover, this provision enables states to secure control of hazardous disposal pro-
grams by meeting a three prong test. Id. § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b). First, the
state program must be equivalent to the federal program. Id. § 3006(b) (1), 42
U.S.C. § 6902(b)(1). Second, the program must be consistent with the federal
program and programs applicable in other states. Id. § 3006(b) (2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6902(b)(2). Third, the program must have enforcement provisions compatible
with the federal program. RCRA § 3006(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (3).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6249; Milstein, supra note 8, at 126 ("RCRA adopts a 'cradle-to-
grave manifest system' to track hazardous waste from its point of origin to its ulti-
mate disposition.").
11. United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1642-43 (1992)
(White,J., dissenting) (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1054 (1992));
GregoryJ. May, Note, United States Department of Energy v. Ohio & The Federal
Facility Compliance Act of 1992: The Supreme Court Forces a Hazardous Compromise in
CWA and RCRA Enforcement Against Federal Agencies, 4 VILL. ENVrL. L.J. 363, 366
(1993); Milstein, supra note 8, at 124.
2
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EPA primarily maintains control over RCRA-driven hazardous
waste treatment in five ways. First, the agency requires owners and
operators of waste facilities to obtain permits for waste treatment
and disposal of hazardous waste.12 Second, EPA issues standards
for storage, treatment and disposal.' 3 Third, the agency may per-
form on-site inspections of facilities. 14 Fourth, if inspectors find
that facility operators have failed to comply with its standards, EPA
may issue administrative compliance orders. 15 Fifth, if facility oper-
ators fail to follow the orders, the agency reserves the right to seek
civil and criminal penalties.16
12. RCRA § 3005(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(b). Under this provision, owners and
operators of hazardous waste facilities must apply to federal or designated state
administrators to receive authorization for storage, treatment and disposal of haz-
ardous and other wastes at a given facility. Id. § 3005(a). The permit application
must include information regarding the composition, content and concentration
of the waste being handled, the schedule for treatment, transport and disposal,
and a description of the site for these activities. Id. § 3005(b). When these criteria
are satisfied, the state or federal administrator issues a permit to the facility. This
permit may be modified by the administrator or by the operator with permission.
A time limit for such modifications is also specified in the permit. Id. § 3005(c).
Federal and state administrators retain the power to revoke permits in response to
an operator's non-compliance with permit or other RCRA standards. Id.
§ 3005(d). Operators who follow proper permit procedure receive interim status
during the processing period, during which operators are treated as if they have
full permit status. RCRA § 30 05(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e).
13. RCRA § 3004(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a). General treatment standards for
hazardous waste facilities include obligations to: (1) record hazardous wastes han-
dled and the manner in which they are handled; (2) apply a system to ensure
proper storage, treatment and disposal of wastes, as defined in RCRA § 3003(5), 42
U.S.C. § 6922(5); (3) treat waste in accordance with standards of the Administra-
tor; (4) indicate the location, design and construction of the facility; (5) enumer-
ate a contingency plan to minimize any unanticipated damage occurring during
the treatment process; and (6) follow any given guidelines regarding ownership,
continuity of operation, personnel training and financial responsibility. RCRA
§ 3004(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a).
14. RCRA § 3007(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a). Under the inspection provision,
any person involved in hazardous waste treatment must supply EPA with relevant
information to assist in the development and enforcement of RCRA provisions.
EPA personnel are also authorized to enter, inspect and take samples at hazardous
waste sites. Id.
15. RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928. When an operator or anyone involved in
hazardous waste disposal violates RCRA requirements, the Administrator may issue
to that person an order demanding compliance with RCRA requirements. The
Administrator may also seek injunctive or other relief in the district court for the
district in which the alleged violation occurs. Id. A compliance order may include
the suspension or revocation of a permit. Id. § 3008(c).
16. RCRA § 3008(c)-(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(c)-(d). For a discussion of an ad-
ministrator's rights to bring an action and seek relief, see supra note 15 and accom-
panying text.
1995]
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EPA may delegate RCRA operating duties to state authorities
and other parties.' 7 The state independently enforces the pro-
gram and has the freedom to apply stricter standards than those
given in RCRA, as long as the state maintains minimum federal
standards.l8
B. CERCLA
There were two primary purposes behind the enactment of
CERCLA. First, Congress recognized the need to establish a re-
sponse mechanism to abate and control the national hazardous
waste crisis. 19 Second, Congress wanted to provide a basis for gov-
ernment intervention and for allocation of funds necessary for the
cleanup of hazardous wastes.20 In general, Congress meant the stat-
ute to go beyond RCRA to facilitate the cleanup of environmental
contamination caused by the release of hazardous substances.2 1
CERCLA furnishes EPA with a Hazardous Substance
Superfund ("Superfund") to back cleanups at sites contaminated by
hazardous substances.2 2 Superfund may also finance cleanups per-
17. RCRA § 3008(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b). EPA may authorize state run
cleanups in lieu of RCRA. Id. For a further discussion of the three prong test that
must be satisfied for EPA to authorize state run cleanups, see supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
18. RCRA § 3009, 42 U.S.C. § 6929. See Old Bridge Chems., Inc. v. NewJersey
Dep't of Envfl. Protection, 965 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 602
(1992) (holding that a state hazardous waste regulation requiring codification of
certain hazardous wastes above and beyond set RCRA standards was consistent with
that statute because RCRA set only floor for state hazardous waste regulation).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 17, 22 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125. Parameters for the execution of CERCLA are set
forth in the national contingency plan ("NCP"), the framework for which is gov-
erned by CERCLA § 105: "The plan shall specify procedures, techniques, materi-
als, equipment, and methods to be employed in identifying, removing, or
remedying releases of hazardous substances...." CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605.
The bill's objective was to "amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act to provide for a
national inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites and to establish a program for
appropriate environmental response action to protect public health and the envi-
ronment from the dangers posed by such sites." H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6125.
20. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6125.
21. Id. For an overview of CERCLA and its applications, see Colorado v.
Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 11 S.Ct. 1584
(1990); see also Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533 (10th Cir. 1992).
22. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611. The primary purposes of Superfund
are: (1) to pay for response costs incurred by a person's authorized action under
the National Contingency Plan; (2) to pay for claims resulting from a real or
threatened hazardous release; (3) to pay for other rehabilitation and damage as-
sessment costs; (4) to give grants for technical assistance; and (5) to pay for the
costs of a pilot program to correct lead contaminated soil. CERCLA § 111 (a) (1)-
4
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formed jointly by federal and state or local authorities.23 Once the
cleanup is complete, CERCLA empowers the federal government to
sue responsible parties for the costs. 24 Defenses under the statute
are meager2 5 and liability is strict.26
Absent a cooperative agreement providing Superfund financ-
ing, CERCLA also provides for independent cleanup action by state
authorities. 27 Like the federal government, state authorities may
take action under CERCLA against responsible parties to recover
cleanup costs.28
(6), 42 U.S.C. 9611(a) (1)-(6). Remedial actions at federal facilities cannot be fi-
nanced by Superfund. CERCLA § III(e) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (e) (3).
23. CERCLA § 104(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d). EPA may enter a contract or co-
operative agreement with a state or political subdivision to commence a cleanup in
accordance with the National Contingency Plan. Id.
24. Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Responsible parties may include current
and prior owners or operators of a facility, one of those entity's parent corpora-
tions, or any person engaged in or contracted for treatment or disposal of hazard-
ous waste at the site. Id. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044
(2d Cir. 1985) (ruling generally that present owners at site where release occurred
and past owners of site when release occurred may be held liable under CERCLA
§ 107); United States v. Pretty Products, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1488 (S.D. Ohio 1991)
(giving EPA access to records of subsidiary owner's parent corporation for pur-
poses of targeting potentially responsible parties and ensuring speedy cleanup, re-
gardless of any evidence of subsidiary's ability to finance the cleanup
independently).
25. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). Potentially liable parties must
demonstrate "by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of
release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused
solely by: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of War; (3) an act or omission of a third
party . .. ." Id. The third party defense is only available when that person is not
under contract, employ or other business agreement with the defendant and the
defendant showed due care regarding the hazardous substances and took precau-
tions against any forseeable acts or omissions of third parties. Id. See also United
States v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 405 (D. Md. 1991) (dismissing allega-
tions of contributory or comparative negligence by United States, lack of for-
seeability of damages and exercise of due care by defendants because of narrow
scope of§ 107 defenses); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987)
(pointing out that questions of party's fault or state of mind are irrelevant to CER-
CLA liability).
26. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Under this provision, responsible
parties are liable for all costs of a removal or remedial action, other response costs
incurred, and costs for damages to natural resources. Id. See also United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989)
(imposing CERCLA liability on hazardous waste site owners, over their allegation
that they were innocent absentee landowners, due to their failure to dispute their
ownership of the site and ownership during the hazardous release).
27. CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a). States may impose additional lia-
bility for the release of hazardous substances above and beyond liability dictated
under CERCLA provisions. Id.
28. Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The cost recovery provision gives regu-
latory authorities access to virtually anyone in any way involved with the release of a
hazardous substance. Id. Costs may include payment for removal or remedial ac-
tion by federal or state governments that is authorized by the National Contin-
19951
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CERCLA also grants EPA special authority to respond to
threatened or actual hazardous releases.29 One form of an EPA re-
sponse is an injunction requiring responsible parties to undertake a
cleanup. 30 Because there are so many problematic sites, CERCLA
authorizes EPA to promulgate a National Priority List ("NPL")
which ranks sites according to the gravity of their individual
hazards. 3' Sites which are not on the NPL cannot receive a
Superfund remedy. 32
C. State and Federal Interests - The Case Law
While CERCLA clearly establishes the federal government's au-
thority to seek injunctive relief, a state's ability to do so is not as
clear. This problem is embodied in the clash between two antitheti-
cal cases concerning issues of federal government sovereign immu-
nity and states' rights to injunctive relief: Colorado v. Idarado Mining
Co.33 and United States v. Akzo Coatings of America, Inc.34 In Idarado,
the court decided that CERCLA's state enforcement provision per-
gency Plan, and payment for injuries to natural resources. Id. See Manor Care, Inc.
v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Congress did not intend for CERCLA
remedies to preempt complementary state remedies.").
29. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). The primary focus of the
provision is the existence of a danger to public health or the environment. There-
fore, the provision allows an immediate reponse to a release or threat of a release
of a hazardous substance. Id. The term release is virtually all-encompassing and
includes any entry of a hazardous substance into the environment. Id. § 101 (22),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). In executing this authority, the President must act in accord-
ance with the National Contingency Plan, which outlines the hazardous waste
treatment and removal scheme embodied in CERCLA. Id. § 105(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605(a). For a discussion of the National Contingency Plan, see supra note 19
and accompanying text.
30. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). "[T~he district court of the
United States in the district in which the threat occurs shall have jurisdiction to
grant such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may require." Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D. N.H. 1985).
31. CERCLA § 105(a)(8), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (8). Sites on the national prior-
ity list are ranked according to their perceived degree of threat to public health
and the environment. Id.
32. CERCLA § 104(d)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(1)(C). This section only
allocates reimbursement funds for response actions for sites on the NPL. Id.
33. 707 F. Supp. 1227 (D. Colo. 1989), rev'd, 916 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 960 (1991). In Idarado, the State of Colorado sought a declara-
tory judgment imposing liability on mine owners and operators for cleanup costs
and damage to natural facilities at and near the mines. Idarado, 707 F. Supp. at
1229. The district court held the mine owners and operators responsible for the
costs of cleaning up the tailings piles as well as the costs of conducting blood
screening of residents in a nearby town. Id.
34. 719 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Mich. 1989). In Akzo, EPA moved for a consent
decree for a CERCLA cleanup at a toxic waste site and Michigan challenged the
consent decree. Id. The District Court allowed state intervention and also found
that the consent decree did not violate Michigan's anti-degradation law. Id.
6
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mits states to seek injunctive relief in federal court against polluters
with respect to a particular site, regardless of whether the federal
government has commenced cleanup actions there. 35 The Akzo
court, however, interpreted the same provision as only permitting
states injunctive relief in actions concerning existing consent de-
crees (where cleanup under a settlement is already initiated),
thereby preventing a state from imposing any additional remedies
beyond the consent decree.3 6
Another confusing question is whether federal courts have ju-
risdiction over citizen suits brought pursuant to CERCLA and
RCRA. One limitation on jurisdiction appears in CERCLA section
113, which denies federal courts jurisdiction over challenges to
CERCLA response actions.3 7 In Schalk v. Reilly,3 8 the Seventh Cir-
cuit denied jurisdiction over a CERCLA citizen suit because the
plaintiff challenged a consent decree established between EPA and
the responsible parties.39 The court reasoned that the citizen suit
would cause cleanup delays that section 113 was deliberately en-
acted to avoid. The provision, therefore, barred the challenge. 40
In Boarhead Co. v. Erickson,41 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit denied jurisdiction to a claim under the National
Historic Site Protection Act,42 because the complainant attempted
35. Idarado, 707 F. Supp. at 1232; see also CERCLA § 121(e) (2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621 (e) (2).
36. Akzo, 719 F. Supp. at 577-80; see also CERCLA § 121(b)-(f), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(b)-(f). "[Section 9621] does not empower the State to require the parties
to comply with standards that were not embodied in the remedial action plan."
Akzo, 719 F. Supp. at 578.
37. CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). The provision governing civil
proceedings denies federal courts jurisdiction to review challenges to EPA or EPA
delegated removal or remedial actions. Id. There are specific exceptions to the
rule that apply in actions to: recover response costs incurred in a cleanup, and
enforce and secure reimbursements for a § 106(a) emergency abatement cleanup.
United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1576 (10th Cir. 1993). See, e.g., Alabama
v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989)
(denying citizen groups standing to challenge EPA remedial action prior to com-
pletion). But see Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (uphold-
ing landowners' challenge to EPA's lien on their property because action attacked
CERCLA action itself and not any EPA removal or remedial action).
38. 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990).
39. In Schalk, a citizens' challenge to a consent decree for a CERCLA reme-
dial action was defeated because the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
consider challenges to remedial actions which had not vet been completed. Id. at
1095 (citing Alabama, 871 F.2d at 1557).
40. Id. at 1097.
41. 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991).
42. The National Historic Site Protection Act ("NHPA") §§ 1-307, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 470-470w-6 (1966).
1995]
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to delay a CERCLA response action pending a decision regarding
the site's status as a historic landmark. 43
II. FACTS
By 1980, Basin F at "the Arsenal," a federal hazardous waste
storage, treatment and disposal facility, was in dire need of
cleanup. 44 Before a cleanup could occur, however, the United
States Army had to obtain a RCRA permit and complete other pro-
cedural steps.45 The Army applied for and received RCRA interim
status.46 In 1983, the Army made efforts to submit a satisfactory
closure plan to EPA, but EPA found the plan deficient.47 The Army
never sufficiently completed the permit application process but in-
stead began a CERCLA remedial investigation/feasibility study
("RI/FS") in 1984.48
Due to the Army's lack of conformity with RCRA procedure,
EPA authorized Colorado to carry out its own waste management
43. Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1011. In Boarhead, a property owner's attempt to
invoke the National Historic Preservation Act to halt pre-cleanup activities at a
designated Superfund site was found to lack subject matter jurisdiction because of
CERCLA § 113(h). Id. at 1021.
44. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1569 (quoting Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1531). The Rocky
Mountain Arsenal hazardous waste facility is "one of the worst hazardous waste
pollution sites in the country." Id.
45. Id. The Arsenal is subject to RCRA regulation. Id. See RCRA § 3004(a), 42
U.S.C. § 6924(a). RCRA standards are enforced by requiring owners and opera-
tors of hazardous waste treatment facilities to obtain permits. Colorado, 990 F.2d at
1569. See RCRA § 3005, 42 U.S.C. § 6925. There are two parts to the RCRA permit
application process. While part A of the application only requires a general de-
scription of the facility and its treatment plan, part B requires more specificity.
Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1571 n.7. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.13 (1992). For a discussion of
RCRA, see supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
46. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1571. "Interim status" is a temporary period during
which provisional removal steps are taken until permit application is received and
a permanent treatment plan is put into place. RCRA § 3005(e)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925(e)(1). The Army had successfully completed part A of the permit applica-
tion, and was given authorization to begin the cleanup process. Colorado, 990 F.2d
at 1571.
47. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1571. The Army submitted two deficient versions of
the part B application, and in 1984, EPA threatened termination of the Army's
interim status. Id.
48. Id. "A RI/FS is the first step in a CERCLA remedial action in order to
'assess site conditions and evaluate alternatives to the extent necessary to select a
remedy.'" Id. at 1571 n.9 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(2) (1992)). CERCLA
authority with respect to Department of Defense facilities is delegated to the Secre-
tary of Defense instead of EPA. Id. at 1571 n.9. See Exec. Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed.
Reg. 42,237 (1981), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,418, 48 Fed. Reg. 20,891
(1983), revoked by and current delegation of authority at Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52
Fed. Reg. 2,923 (1987). On appeal, the Army argued that this alternate source of
authority preempted any duties and that it had to comply with RCRA permit stan-
dards. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1571.
8
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program, the Colorado Hazardous Waste Management Act
("CHWMA"), 49 in lieu of federal action under RCRA.50 CHWMA
required the Army to undergo an authorization procedure identi-
cal to that under RCRA, but the Colorado Department of Health
("CDH") found the Army's plan to close the site to be unsatisfac-
tory.5 1 As a result, CDH issued its own plan for the Arsenal cleanup
to the Army in 1986, and requested Army cooperation in this
effort.52
The Army questioned CDH's jurisdiction over the cleanup and
refused to execute CDH's proposed plan.5 3 In response, CDH
brought an action in state court in 1986 to enforce the CHWMA
closure plan. 54 By 1987, the Army, EPA, Shell Oil and the state of
Colorado agreed on an interim response action until the resolution
of a final remedy. 55 Despite this agreement, Colorado refused to
assist the Army in formulating its cleanup plan. 56 Soon after, the
Army announced to Colorado that it was terminating its cleanup
49. Colorado Hazardous Waste Management Act ("CHWMA"), COLO. REv.
STAT. §§ 25-15-301 to 25-15-316 (1984). CHWMA provided the Colorado Depart-
ment of Health ("CDH") with the same administrative authority as EPA to enforce
the cleanup. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1571.
50. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1571. EPA delegated RCRA authority to Colorado
pursuant to § 3006(b). RCRA § 3006(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b).
51. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1571. The Army's part B CHWMA/RCRA application
was identical to the deficient one submitted to EPA in 1983. Id.
52. Id. at 1571-72.
53. Id. at 1572.
54. Id. The Army removed this action to federal district court. Id. The Army
claimed that "CERCLA's enforcement and response provisions pre-empt and pre-
clude a state RCRA enforcement action with respect to the cleanup of hazardous
wastes at the Arsenal. Id.
55. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1572. For over thirty years, Shell Oil had disposed of
hazardous waste at the Arsenal. Id. at 1572 n.10.
56. Id. at 1572. In 1987, the Army sought state help in targeting potential
applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements ("ARAR's") for the response
action and comment on its cleanup proposal, but Colorado gave no response. Id.
CERCLA § 121(d) provides in pertinent part:
[Remedial actions] shall attain a degree of cleanup of hazardous sub-
stances, pollutants, and contaminants released into the environment and
of control of further release at a minimum which assures protection of
human health and the environment. Such remedial actions shall be rele-
vant and appropriate under the circumstances presented by the release
or threatened release of such substance, pollutant, or contaminant.
CERCLA § 121 (d), 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (d). The provision further affirms federal and
state authority over regulating hazardous cleanups, addresses the applicability of
the Clean Water Act, and criteria for enforcement of state regulatory standards.
Id.
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action under CHWMA and that it would commence the cleanup
pursuant to CERCLA. 57
After issuing a draft decision for its interim response action to
EPA, Colorado, and Shell Oil, the Army made progress in its
cleanup at Basin F through 1988.58 Despite the Army's removal ef-
forts under CERCLA, in 1989 the district court decided that Colo-
rado had the authority to enforce CHWMA as delegated by EPA
under RCRA.59 One month later, EPA added Basin F to the NPL,
indicating that cleanup there had sparked federal concern. 60 The
Army immediately moved for reconsideration of the matter in light
of this change of events.
61
As a follow-up to the district court order, CDH issued a final
amended compliance order to the Army, requiring a comprehen-
sive amended closure plan that would be subject to CDH approval
and control. 62 Both parties sought a rehearing, and filed cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment. The district court applied a CERCLA
provision that the court read as prohibiting the state from challeng-
ing the Army's CERC[A remedial action prior to its completion. 63
The court relied on the placement of Basin F on the NPL to distin-
guish its previous decision, and held that the Army's CERCLA-
57. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1572. The Army did indicate that it would comply
with CHWMA in so far as it is covered in CERCLA provisions 120(i) and
121(d) (2) (A) (i). Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1572. Section 120(i) obligates the United
States and any of its agencies to comply with any applicable requirements of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act. CERCLA § 120(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(i).
58. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1572. The Army moved and relocated 8,000,000 gal-
lons of hazardous liquid wastes and 500,000 cubic yatds of contaminated solid ma-
terial from basin F, and capped the basin floor. Id.
59. Id. at 1572-73. In reaching its decision, the district court relied on several
key provisions of RCRA and CERCLA. First, the court invoked the CERCLA provi-
sion that applies state law to removal and remedial action at federal facilities for
which cleanup is not an official national priority. Id. at 1573 (citing Colorado v.
United States Dep't of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1569-70 (D. Colo. 1989)); see
CERCLA § 120(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(i). Second, the court applied the RCRA provi-
sion mandating that federal authorities engaging in waste disposal must comply
with substantive and procedural requirements for such disposal that are dictated
by state, interstate, and local authorities. Colorado, 707 F. Supp. at 1565. Third, the
court relied on the CERCLA provision that allows state authorities to impose re-
quirements above and beyond those dictated under CERCLA. Colorado, 707 F.
Supp. at 1565; see CERCLA §§ 114, 152(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9614(a), 9652(d).
60. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1573.
61. Id. The District Court had given particular weight to the CERCLA provi-
sion which stated that RCRA-driven state authorities would be binding on federal
facilities not listed on the NPL. Id. at 1569. Reasoning that the placement on the
priority list would preempt CHWMA, the Army moved for a rehearing. Id. at 1573.
62. Id.
63. Id. See CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). The court enjoined Colo-
rado and CDH from enforcing the final amended compliance order. Colorado, 990
F.2d at 1574.
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driven remedial action preempted RCRA, and therefore the state
could not enforce its compliance order.64
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed, ruling on three important issues. First, the court
held that the amended compliance order was not a challenge to the
Army's CERCLA response action. 65 Second, the court held that
placement on the NPL had no bearing on the Army's duties to
comply with CHWMA. 6 6 Finally, the court held the presidential au-
thority under CERCLA that delegated to the Army the right to se-
lect a remedy did not relegate the state to a mere advisory role or
bar the state from enforcing state law independent of CERCLA.67
III. ANALYSIS: UNITED STATES V. COLORADO
A. The Jurisdictional Issue
The threshold question of jurisdiction in United States v. Colo-
rado centered around a CERCLA provision that barred review of
state challenges to CERCLA removal actions.68  "Challenges" are
not defined explicitly in the statute, but the court interepreted the
term according to its plain meaning.69 Challenges, therefore, do
not merely arise in any claim against federal CERCLA cleanup au-
thorities; the court found that to hold so would be to give the fed-
eral government absolute immunity.70 Rather, for the Tenth
64. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1574. See CERCLA § 120(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9620(a) (4). While the provision indicates that state laws apply to federal facilities
not on the NPL, there is nothing explicitly in the language to indicate that federal
facilities on the NPL would not have to answer to state regulation. Colorado, 990
F.2d at 1574.
65. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1575. The court found that the key issue was not
whether a response action had been completed under CERCLA, but whether a
challenge to the response action occurred. Id.
66. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1580. See CERCLA § 120(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9620(a) (4).
67. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1581. See CERCLA §§ 114(a), 152(b), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9614(a), 9652(b).
68. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1575. For an analysis of CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(h), see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
69. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1579. "[T]he plain language of both statutes [RCRA
and CERCLA] provides for state enforcement of its RCRA responsibilities despite
an ongoing CERCLA response action. Thus, enforcement actions under state haz-
ardous waste laws ... do not constitute 'challenges' to CERCLA response actions."
Id.
70. Id. at 1577. The fact that enforcement of Colorado's compliance order
would "impact the implementation" of the Army's CERCLA response action was
insufficient to constitute a challenge tinder CERCLA § 113(h). Id. For an analysis
of Section 113, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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Circuit, challenges are those efforts that are deliberately made to
slow down CERCLA remedial actions. 71
The court reasoned that the state's compliance order was not
an attempt to hinder or thwart cleanup at Basin F, but instead was
an attempt to encourage the cleanup process. As such, the compli-
ance order did not constitute a challenge and thus, the action was
clearly within the court's jurisdiction. 72
The Army cited two primary cases to support their jurisdiction
argument.73 In both instances, the court denied jurisdiction where
parties initiated challenges against CERCLA response actions.7 4
Nevertheless, the court found that those cases were factually distin-
guishable from the dispute at hand.7 5
First, the Army argued that its case was analogous to Schalk v.
Reilly in which the court barred private citizens from bringing a
CERCLA citizen suit challenging a consent decree entered by EPA
regarding a hazardous waste cleanup.76 The District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana held that there was no subject matter
jurisdiction over challenges to incomplete CERCLA remedial ac-
tions. 77 Even so, the fact that the appellants in Schalk were proceed-
ing under CERCLA's citizen suit provision indicated that Schalk
involved a different procedural problem from the case at hand.7 8
Recognizing this, the Colorado court distinguished Schalk on the
grounds that the state did not assert jurisdiction, or lose its right to
it, under the citizen suit provision.79
Next, the Army invoked Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, which de-
nied jurisdiction over an attempt to stay an EPA CERCLA response
71. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1576.
72. Id. at 1579.
73. Id. at 1576.
74. Id.
75. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577.
76. Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1091. For a further discussion of Schalk, see supra note
39 and accompanying text.
77. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577. In Schalk, the citizen-appellants maintained
that their request for EPA to adhere to certain procedural requirements was not a
challenge to the removal action. Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1097. Nevertheless, the court
held that the procedural restrictions ventured by the citizens would hamper expe-
dient implementation of the CERCLA remedy and as such would contradict con-
gressional intent to avoid undue delay in reaching CERCLA remedies. Id.
78. The citizens in Schalk were trying to establish jurisdiction under CERCLA
§ 310. Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1097. The CERCLA citizen suit provision, § 310, gener-
ally authorizes any person or government agency to commence a civil action
against any person or government agency allegedly in violation of CERCLA stan-
dards. CERCLA § 310(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a).
79. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577.
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action.80 The court reasoned that Boarhead did not apply because
in that case Boarhead was one of the responsible parties and its
action against the EPA removal contravened the congressional in-
tent behind CERCLA section 9613(h).81 Also, the plaintiff there
clearly tried to delay the CERCLA cleanup pending a determina-
tion of whether the site qualified for historical landmark status.8 2
In the present case, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that Colorado in-
tended the compliance order to apply stricter cleanup standards,
not to delay the cleanup.83
In distinguishing Schalk and Boarhead, and in enforcing the
compliance order, the court paid particular attention to the con-
gressional intent behind CERCLA.84 The court found that CER-
CLA's "savings provision" indicates that CERCLA should work in
conjunction with other federal and state laws in addressing
problems of hazardous waste disposal. s5 Despite the clear language
in CERCLA to the contrary, the lower court read the statute as pre-
empting RCRA when interpreting CDH's issuance of the compli-
ance order as belonging in the adversarial context of a challenge.8 6
The next step for the Tenth Circuit was to determine whether
RCRA and CHWMA, though generally not preempted by CERCLA,
applied in the factual context of the case.87 The Army failed to
demonstrate an authorized exemption from compliance with RCRA
in the cleanup.88 Because Basin F is a federal facility and EPA dele-
gated RCRA authority to Colorado, the court held that RCRA and
CHWMA clearly applied to the disposal at Basin F.89
Rather than operating under the CERCLA citizen suit provi-
sion, as occurred in Schalk, Colorado pursued its counterpart in
80. Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1014.
81. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577.
82. Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1015.
83. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1576.
84. Id. at 1575, 1577-78.
85. Id. at 1575; see CERCLA § 302(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) ("Nothing in [CER-
CLA] shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any person
under other ... [liaw ... with respect to releases of hazardous substances or other
pollutants or contaminants."); Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d at 127 (3d Cir.
1991) ("Congress did not intend for CERCLA remedies to preempt complemen-
tary state remedies.").
86. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1574.
87. Id. at 1576.
88. Id. See RCRA § 6001, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (authorizing President to exempt
federal facilities from compliance with RCRA when such exemption is in "the para-
mount interest of the United States").
89. Id. See RCRA § 6001, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (indicating that federal facilities are
subject to RCRA regulation); Parola v. Weinberger, 848 F.2d 956, 960 (9th Cir.
1988) (applying RCRA § 6001 to state and local regulation of federal facilities).
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RCRA.90 The statute allows for RCRA enforcement at a site even
when a CERCLA enforcement action is underway.9' Other RCRA
citizen suits allow any person to take action against any other in
order to confront any substantial threat to human health or the
environment. 92 These types of citizen suits are barred, however,
when EPA is involved with or is otherwise pursuing a CERCLA re-
moval action. 93 Because Congress explicitly made this limitation to
RCRA imminent hazard citizen suits without doing the same for
RCRA citizen enforcement suits, the Colorado court concluded that
Congress necessarily intended RCRA citizen enforcement actions to
apply to CERCLA removal actions.94
The matter was not merely one of intent behind the compli-
ance order, for the court held that even if the order constituted a
challenge, Colorado could still enforce the order in state court.95
The court supported this interpretation by looking to CHWMA,
which provides for enforcement through the Colorado state
courts. 96 As a result, the court held that section 113(h) does not
bar Colorado from taking action to enforce its compliance order,
and while the facts of the case established jurisdiction in federal
court in this case, the court also held that states may also have juris-
diction over challenges to pending federal removal actions. 97
Finally, the Army contended that the placement of Basin F on
the NPL was a clear indication that CERCLA section 113(h) denied
90. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577.
91. Id. Under the citizen suit provision, any person may commence a civil
action against any other person, including the United States government, to en-
force RCRA provisions. RCRA § 7002(a) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1) (A). These
suits are barred only when EPA or the state is tenaciously pursuing a parallel RCRA
enforcement action. See, e.g., Supporters to Oppose Pollution, Inc. v. Heritage
Group, 973 F.2d 1320, 1323-24 (7th Cir. 1992).
92. CERCLA § 7002(a) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1) (B).
93. Id. For descriptions of CERCLA removal actions that bar RCRA imminent
hazard citizen suits, see CERCLA, §§ 104, 106, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606.
94. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1578.
95. Id. at 1579. The court reasoned that the plain language of § 9613(h) only
barred federal jurisdiction over the claim. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1579. "No Federal
court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law.., or under State law.., to review
any challenges to removal or remedial action ... ." CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(h). For a discussion of§ 113(h), see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
96. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1579; seeCoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 25-15-305(2) (b), 25-15-
309(1) (1984). CHWMA is enforced in the state "district court for the district in
which the site or facility is ... located" or in the "district in which the violation
occurs." Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1579 (quoting COLO. Rv. STAT. §§ 25-15-305(2) (b),
25-15-309(1) (Supp. 1992)).
97. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1579.
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CHWMA jurisdiction over the Basin F cleanup. 98 The court found,
however, that while the list is useful as a ranking order for EPA
cleanups, the list in no way exempts listed facilities from appropri-
ate state regulation. 99 Therefore, for the Colorado court, the NPL
had no bearing on the CERCLA jurisdiction provision, nor on the
force of the CDH compliance order.1 00
B. EPA's Choice of Remedy:
The Army argued in the alternative that a CERCLA provision
that gives EPA the power to choose the remedy, with state input,
through the use of applicable relevant and appropriate require-
ments ("ARARs") precluded Colorado from administering state
laws such as CHWMA concurrently with federal CERCLA actions. 10 1
The Army argued that Congress intended the ARAR provision1 0 2 to
provide "a mechanism for state involvement in the selection and
adoption of remedial actions which are federal in character."10 3
Apparently, however, the Army made the same mistake in interpret-
ing the ARAR provision as it did with the NPL provision; the court
stated thatjust because one particular right is affirmed in one provi-
sion, it does not follow that it is excluded everywhere else. 104
Therefore, the court held there was no indication in the statute that
98. Id. at 1580. The NPL is "the list of priority releases for long term remedial
evaluation and response." 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b) (1992).
99. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1580. The NPL "serves primarily informational pur-
poses, identifying for the States and the public those facilities and sites or other
releases which appear to warrant remedial action." S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 60 (1980). Under CERCLA, the National Contingency Plan is required to
include a hierarchy of cleanups to be conducted under Superfund. CERCLA
§ 105(a) (8) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (8) (A). In 1982, EPA adopted the Hazardous
Ranking System ("HRS") method for prioritizing sites for remedial and removal
actions. 47 Fed. Reg. 10,972 (1982). Under the HRS, EPA rates a given site for its
toxicity by measuring the potential degree or harm from exposure to hazardous
substances at the site. 48 Fed. Reg. 40,658 (1983). Certain test results are worked
into a formula which produces that site's HRS score. Id. If that site reaches a set
threshold score then EPA places the site on the NPL. Id. For a thorough discus-
sion of the NPL as promulgated under the NCP, see Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA,
759 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
100. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1580.
101. Id. at 1574; see CERCLA § 121(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (a) ("[Tlhe President
shall select appropriate remedial actions determined to be necessary to carry out
under section 9604 ... which are in accordance with this section, and to the extent
practicable, the national contingency plan, and which provide for cost effective
response.").
102. For a discussion of ARARs and the CERCLA cleanup standards provi-
sion, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
103. Idarado, 916 F.2d at 1495; see also Akzo, 949 F.2d at 1455.
104. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1581.
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Congress, in enacting CERCLA, intended the ARAR process to be
the state's only role in federal hazardous waste actions. 0 5
Furthermore, the court observed that, although the compli-
ance order clearly went beyond the ARAR role so narrowly con-
strued for it by the Army, it did not impinge on EPA's right to select
a remedy for the Basin F cleanup.' 0 6 Because Congress enacted the
ARAR provision years after initial CERC[A provisions outlining
state involvement, the provision clearly is not the final limit on state
roles in federal hazardous cleanups.' 07
The ARAR section, CERCLA section 121 (d), dictates that EPA
must allow state involvement and commentary on remedial plans,
but only grants states the power to enforce state law at the comple-
tion of the remedial action. 0 8 The Colorado court found, how-
ever, that other provisions of CERCLA, contemplating more
extensive state involvement, sufficiently sprung CHWMA from the
confines of the ARAR provision.' 9
IV. CRITICAL ANALvSiS
The result of the Colorado decision is a practical step towards
resolution of the national hazardous waste problem for several rea-
sons. The government is notorious for being the nation's worst pol-
luter.'10 Even so, the federal government has escaped liability for
hazardous waste problems by using the sovereign immunity defense
against state actions.I 1 In addition, Congress' view of states' role as
secondary and supporting in the national hazardous waste problem
is inefficient and impractical." 2
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. CERCLA §§ 114(a), 302(d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9614(a), 9652(d) were pres-
ent in the initial drafting of the statute, but 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (f) (1) was only added
in the 1986 CERCLA amendments.
108. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1581; see CERCLA §§ 121(d) (2) (A), 121(f)(2)-(3),
42 U.S.C. §§ 9621(d) (2) (A), 9621 (f) (2)-(3).
109. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1581. CERCLA §§ 114(a), 302(d), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9614(a), 9652(d) point towards the application of other federal and state laws
even while a CERCLA removal action is pending.
110. See generally Adam Babich, Circumventing Environmental Laws: Does the Sov-
ereign Have A License to Pollute?, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 28 (1991); Elizabeth
Cheng, Comment, Lawmaker as Lawbreaker: Assessing Civil Penalties Against Federal
Facilities Under RCRA, 57 U. CHi. L. REv. 845 (1991);J.B. Wolverton, Note, Sovereign
Immunity and National Priorities: Enforcing Federal Facilities' Compliance with Environ-
mental Statutes, 15 HAsv. ENvrL. L. REv. 565 (1991).
111. See generally Milstein, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
112. States are in a better position to respond to local concerns. James P.
Young, Comment, Expanding State Initiation and Enforcement Under Superfund, 57 U.
CHi. L. REv. 985 (1990).
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The Arsenal in general, and Basin F in particular, are good
examples of the problem of pollution at federal facilities.' 13
Though the facility has been in the control of the United States
Army for over forty years, its cleanup efforts were clearly deficient;
in 1989, EPA placed Basin F on the NPL for sites most in need of
cleanup. 14 Despite this move by EPA, the facts cast doubt upon
the agency's intent to perform a thorough cleanup.11 5 Thus, there
is no guarantee of an efficient cleanup when the federal govern-
ment is the only regulatory authority.' 16
The sovereign immunity defense, as exemplified by CERCLA
section 9613(h), is typically justified by the notion that fines and
injunctions imposed on the government divert funds needed for
cleanups and slow down the cleanup process." 7 Even so, United
States v. Colorado demonstrates the dire consequences when govern-
ment authority over hazardous cleanups goes unchecked. While
citizen suits must still fall within the available sovereign immunity
waiver provisions, this case provides a new channel for increased
state regulation of federal hazardous waste disposal sites under
RCRA delegated authority.
By allowing the State's compliance order and extending state
court jurisdiction to pending CERCLA removal actions under
CHWMA, the Colorado court closed a potentially dangerous CER-
CLA loophole that would have exempted the federal government
from state regulation at some of the nation's worst hazardous waste
sites. By breaking down CERCLA and state law barriers, the court
encourages, if not mandates, cooperation between EPA and state
authorities at hazardous waste sites. One can only hope that team-
work in this setting will prompt a more efficient allocation of time
and funding resources at these sites.
113. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1569.
114. Id. at 1573.
115. Although the Army's goal was to complete the cleanup with a minimal
expenditure of money and effort, their justice department attorneys in the district
court action also represented EPA. Colorado, 707 F. Supp. at 1570.
116. According to the inspector general of the Department of the Defense,
[t]he Department of Defense is not in full compliance with the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act and other environmental laws and regula-
tions .... Overall management of hazardous materials/hazardous waste
is unsatisfactory .... The hazardous waste disposal contracting method is
inefficient, at times ineffective, and costly. Training and education of
hazardous material handlers and commanders is inadequate.
Andersen & Spear, Pentagon's Bad Record on Toxic Waste, WASH. PosT, Sept. 30, 1986,
at C13.
117. May, supra note 11, at 368 n.26.
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There are obvious advantages to creating a central authority
for nation-wide hazardous waste cleanup. Uniformity in this cause
promotes quicker responses to the ongoing problems and ensures
that common standards in cleanups are upheld.118 On the other
hand, there is evidence that uniform national standards deliber-
ately are geared towards irresponsible industrial polluters rather
than desired nation-wide norms.119 As a result of their stringency
and arbitrariness such standards often penalize well-meaning cor-
porate actors. 20
Moreover, EPA sets the requirements for removal actions but
when they are handled improperly, EPA is only indirectly politically
liable to the local communities that suffer most from shoddy clean-
ups. 12 ' This is inconsistent with the congressional goals of main-
taining minimum cleanup standards while otherwise allowing states
and other involved parties freedom to increase required perform-
ance levels and otherwise handle the projects autonomously. 22 In
United States v. Colorado, the court struck a proper balance in al-
lowing the state to impose its own stringent cleanup standards,
while allowing EPA to maintain its authority. 23
James T. Heeney
118. "States are better positioned to respond to local concerns than the EPA,
which is only indirectly politically accountable to local communities." Young, supra
note 112, at 985.
119. 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 505, 515 (1992); seeE. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GoING By
THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 548-619 (1992).
120. BARDACH AND KAGAN, supra note 110, at 1548.
121. Young, supra note 112, at 985.
122. Id. at 1003.
123. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1571. While the CHWMA compliance order did
impinge upon the CERCLA removal action, the CDH proposal only subsumed
RCRA with EPA approval. Id.
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